CIP-1694: Pluralism Now!
CIP-1694: Pluralism Now! After Town Hall Discussion hosted by Kenric Nelson (Photrek) and Stephen Whitenstall (QADAO)
Last updated
CIP-1694: Pluralism Now! After Town Hall Discussion hosted by Kenric Nelson (Photrek) and Stephen Whitenstall (QADAO)
Last updated
CIP-1694: Pluralism Now! After Town Hall Discussion hosted by Kenric Nelson (Photrek) and Stephen Whitenstall (QADAO)
CIP-1694 -
CIP-1694 Comment Thread -
Code:
Discussion:
Previous ATH on Decentralization: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Timestamps
Welcome - Kenric -
Introduction -
"All the President's Bankers" - -
Decentralization as a cover for plutocracy -
"identity verification is very difficult without some centralized oracle" -
"Reducing the power of entities with large amounts of Ada" -
Wealth as a replacement of Identity -
Edinburgh Workshop - Steph - Wolfram-
Merging of CIP-1694 - Jenny -
Voluntary release of control - Eystein - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mathematica Notebook "A Plural Voting Design for Cardano’s Delegated Representatives using Hyper-Plutocratic Deposits for Sybil Resistance" -
CIP-1694 voting mechanism -
Delegate Weight will be pluralism -
Deposit Weight will be "hyper plutocratic" Sybil Resistance Mechanism -
Minimum deposit will match minimum delegation -
Analysis of Delegate & Deposit Weight -
Graph " log-log plot shows how the voting weight for the delegate and the deposit have opposite slopes as the number of wallets is increased" -
"Deciding power becomes marginal ?" - Thorsten -
Reducing the significance of the power law distribution tail -
Cauchy Distribution -
Comparison with Brexit voting (influence of marginal votes)- - Thorsten
From the Mean to the Median - (true representation of the community) -
Pluralism as Quadratic Voting - Steph - Wolfram -
A whale splitting across wallets - (applying voting power constraints) -
Why no rule preventing this breakdown ? -
Because of the lack of an ID constraint -
Splitting a wallet to increase votes constrained by deposit -
Example - A modest delegation with a minimum deposit cannot split into two wallets -
This proposal proposes a deposit, so dReps will become like SPOs ? - Ninh -
The size of your deposit will effect how many votes you are eligible for -
Weakness of a dRep collaborating with a Whale voter ? - Ninh -
Graph - Even with an investment of 10,000 for the deposits, the maximum votes is limited to 10 wallets -
Possibility of benefit limited by scale and much less than 1C1V-
Graph - DReps deposits of 10,000 ADA to increase delegation to 10 million ADA requires reduction in no of wallets - Need to address Sybil Resistance -
Thresholds would not change overall proportion of votes ? - Marek -
CIP-1694 is linear (1c1v) whilst plural voting takes square root -
Every dRep will try to be top of the curve ? - Marek -
Voting power calculations -
How will changes protect against Sybil attack ? - Marek -
1c1v not a Sybil Attack ? - Assumption of independence of each ADA/Vote pair -
Acceptance of implicit "Sybil Attack" in 1C1V -
(Acceptance of the correlation of voting with plutocratic wealth) Graph - Spread of delegates across wallets - (Sybil resistance in the range of 100 to 10^5 votes) -
Graph - Analysis of DRep Votes using multiple wallets -
Transaction fees as a deterrent - Ken -
dRep deposit as annual fee -
Voting power dependent on stake pool rewards - Thorsten -
Time period for holding pledge - Ninh -
Sybil Resistance requires ID or some cost (resource or reputation) -
Pair-wise co-ordination Sybil resistance - (vbuterin) - ()
Tracking history of dRep wallets -
(highly correlated wallets discounted) Graph - Analysis of solo DRep -
Whale creating 1000 wallets -
How voting distribution normalizes -
10k wallets - CIP-1694 bootstrapping -
General discussion -
Conclusion - Kenric -